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de Beer 
have the discussions in a reciprocal way 
talk as people to people? 
Founded on empirical data - verbatim quotations, with minor modifica-
tion, from transcribed intervieiv with Prof Catherine Odora I loppers, 28 
November 2001. 
Globalization in 25 Words or Less 
Between the horrifying myth and the over-simplified discourse is the 
reality, where from an edge of many silent tears a few greedily smile. 
Felicity Paynter 
University of Leicester 
Leicester, England 
Food, places, people- everything looks pretty much the same. 
James Chia 
National University of Singapore 
Singapore 
Globalization is the intertwining of nations in order to 1 ink the entire 
world and promote the unity of all people. 
14 
Kim Gasser 
University of Kentucky 
Uni led Stales 
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Globalization, or the Vanishing Present of 
Postcolonialism? (and the Figuration of the 
Com prador-Intel lectua I) 
Of Cousins and Cannibals 
Looking back, few theorizations of the rela-
tionship between postcolonial studies and the dis-
courses of globalization stand out in my mind as 
strikingly as that articulated by a professor at 
Princeton, who, on the very first day of a gradu-
ate eminar on the subject, announced: "To the 
new entrants to the area of po tcolonial theory, it 
i now time to say 'Hello, it' over! Welcome to 
the di cour e of globalization.,,, 
Carrying the legacy of urban, middle-class, 
educated Calcutta, speaking and writing in 
English, pur uing a doctorate in British modern-
ist literature, I could have hardly considered 
myself a new entrant in the field of postcolonial 
studies at that point in time. Few members of the 
clas cou ld have, I uppo e. Coming from corners 
of the globe a diver e and PoCo-friendly (or 
hostile, depending on the mood, time and place) 
a the Anglophone and Francophone Caribbean 
i land , China Morocco, Turkey, England Can-
ada and South-Africa not to mention Americans 
from all over the country, everyone in the class 
eemed to have been engaged with one ort of 
(post)colonial legacy or another. And no mere 
'native informant' essentia l ism either- they all 
were engaged in reckonings, epistemic and per-
sonal, of not only such legacie , but of a more 
abstracted theorization of the encounters with 
empire in a larger, global pace. Not 'Empire, I 
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maintain, but 'empire'-one has to refrain from the upper-case 'E' to 
denote a pre-Hardt-and Negriapsarian innocence. Inside-out ide bina-
ries were sti ll functional in such theorization, and we'd probably have 
frowned upon the Orwellian anonymity of the ' multitude.' 
Globalization, however, for me, was another animal altogether. As 
a teenager in India, I remember 1991 as a watershed year, or one that 
everybody considered to be such. That was the magic year when Dr. 
Manmohan Singh, the finance minister of the Narasimah Rao-led tot-
tering minority Congress government, was supposed to have opened the 
floodgates of the Indian market to the mythical giants of globalization 
and liberalization, ending nearly half a century of Nehruvian experi-
mentation with socialist models. Like other mythical animals of con-
temporary politics, these two beasts (we weren't really sure whether 
these were two, twinned, or one and the same) impressed more by their 
accompanying sound and fury than by tangible substance, whether in 
the applause earned from the Congress and business houses or in the 
mutually disparate voices of protest from the pro-Swadeshi Bharatiya 
Janata party and the Communists. Apart from a few new, sporadically 
scattered Ray-Ban showrooms and McDonald 's joints, 'globalization' 
remained something Manmohan Singh had done to the Indian economy, 
rather than a real and tangible presence. The turbaned economist was 
perceived as playing the kind of morale-boosting role for an ailing 
indigenous economy that Alan Greenspan was seen as doing in the Clin-
ton-era United States. Industrially stagnated, Marxist-ruled alcutta, of 
course, lagged behind the booming economic hotspots of Bombay, Ban-
galore and Hyderabad, and it is only now with the benefit of hindsight 
that I look back upon the irony of the 'strongly dialectical ' relationship 
shared by the unsurprising contrasts: Calcutta, the most colonial of 
Indian cities, longtime capital of British India, locked in a ' historicist' 
past (speaking after the Calcuttan Dipesh Chakrabarty), eluded by the 
fast-paced, si licon-implanted sites of global ization; Bombay, Bangalore 
and Hyderabad, cities fast gaining the interest and attention of Bill 
Gates and company, fast kinships with their American counterparts in 
Seattle and San Jose. Even though the transition from the Queen 's 
English to MTV patois had been a smooth one for many, at least in one 
major space of cultural-economic negotiations, postcoloniality and glo-
balization had refused to shake hands. 
As soon as the issues were severed from an immediately Indian 
context, the weaker cousin, ' liberalization,' melted into ai r, maybe cor-
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roborating its once-real solidity. But what about its 'global ' counterpart? 
Not that I thought of During's qucstion- "Does globalization have a 
centre? Is it named America?" as I arrived in the United States, but my 
first couple of years, spent surrounded by the popular vogue of Buckeye 
country music, tractor-pulls, Marlboro and Budlight in the suburban 
Midwest, were unblemished by any such concerns. Once again, with the 
benefit of hindsight, here was the Hardt-and-Negriesque deconstruction 
of the inside-outside binary- if America is the heart of globalization, 
who cares about it in the heartland of the heart? If one exports Kentucky 
Fried Chicken and Windows 2010 to Bangalore, what does one export 
to Toledo, 01 I, or Gary, IN, except maybe the naughty pleasure of utter-
ing "Oh, this J didn't expect. J thought American lifestyle was that of 
The Bold and the Beautiful, and McDonald's its culinary ace!" 
Not that the cast was that di ffercnt- after all, Wall Street is the 
heartland of the heart too, in a different sense! All the same, an eastward 
move coinciding with the September 1 1 tragedies- worldwide eco-
nomic depression does make the globe shrink so- and the buzz of aca-
demia conferred on the existent Foucaldian power-schema of 
postcoloniality, an even stronger cousin that, oh, threatened to swallow 
it. Postcolonialism? That's over. Welcome to globalization! 
This popular version of the relationship between the two, depicting 
the former 's subsumption into the latter, wa clearly more of a disciplin-
ary gesture than one indicative of their interaction in real life. In other 
words, can one offer classes on postcolonial theory any more without 
giving globalization its pride of place, if not in the title, in the reading 
list? Or analyze ites in the global south without yoking these two, artic-
ulating in precise terms the older cousin's subsumption into the younger 
and more strapping one's bubbly life, or its vanishing present, if you 
wi ll? 
Conjunction and subsumption, however, are not quite the ame 
thing, and while future hiring committees might ju tifiably want their 
postcolonial scholars to know their globalization (or in ales er likeli-
hood, vice versa), it is difficult to see how their disciplinary distinctions 
arc made to co llapse completely. Clearly, no theorists feel that way 
either. The question of course is what is thi mystifying relationship 
between these two. 
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Incest or not? 
During's theorization of this relationship indeed stands out among 
several intelligent attempts at it: 
The distinction between postcolonialism and globalization is finally 
a distinction between a theory of dehistoricization (postcolonialism 
as the loss of progressive, teleological time as a master-narrative 
and the recovery of 'non-modem' relations to the past and future) 
on the one side, and, on the other, a theory of de-territorialization 
(globalism) as the retreat of geographical determination and the 
gradual transmutation of objects, styles, work into exchangeable 
and replicable resources with in a fragmented but unified world- ys-
tem in which new cultural-economic routes, zones or regions prolif-
erate. (389) 
Such a definition arrives at the crux of the interdisciplinary negotiation/ 
transition implicit in the relationship between the two, and subsequently, 
in the change of disciplinary focus in reading lists as globalization 
comes to claim its pound of flesh next to its historicizcd antecedent on 
graduate syllabi. In the two terms used by During, 'dehistoricization' 
and 'deterritorialization,' we have respective hints of the critique of his-
toricism, launyhed by subaltern historiographers like Dipesh Chakra-
barty, crucial to the project of contemporary postcolonialists, and the 
critique of geopolitical and gee-economic patterns carried on by globa l-
ization theorists like Saskia Sassen, Joseph Stiglitz and Enrique Dussel. 
Disciplinary differences not only contribute to di stinct points of origin, 
but decisively mold the respective natures of their discourses to the 
point of deciding the amount of cultural capital attached to each: 
"Whereas postcolonialism and postmodernism had been developed 
inside literary and cultural studies and had only circulated in the media 
when their academic currency was in retreat, globali zation came from 
the media and the social sciences, notably, economics, sociology and 
communication studies" (During 387). 
Methodological differences also underline the distinction between 
postcolonialism and globalization for Arif Dirlik, though he finds the 
two united in "their attitudes towards the location of Eurocentricism:"1 
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Methodologically speaking, postcolonialism in its most popular 
forms (in the United States, at least) eschews questions of the struc-
turations of the world in terms of "foundational categories" and 
stresses local encounters in the formations of identities; it is in 
many ways driven by a radical methodological individualism and is 
situationist in its historical explanations ... Globalism on the other 
hand draws attention to the structurations of the world by forces 
' . 
that operate at the highest level of abstraction and, in some of its 
versions, finds in such abstractions the reaffinnation of the scien-
tific promises of socia l theory. (27) 
These differences help Dirlik to tie the relationship between these two 
frameworks to an issue that has been almost consensually agreed on by 
most commentators that of the difference in temporal focus . Whether 
or not the ideal aim of postcolonial theory is to dehi toricize notions of 
time, as articulated by During and Chakrabarty, surely it place its focus 
squarely on the past, whatever it might eventually do with such a ~oc.us. 
"Armed with the in ight of the present," Dirlik writes, "postcolonialists 
proceed to reinterpret the pa t with the very same insights." .Glo~a~iza­
tion clearly ref use to look back, and, in this refusal, seems 1mphc1t a 
similar denial of hi toricism that events can be rationally explained by 
their linear progress through historical time. More important for our 
purposes here, while postcolonialism seeks to dehistoricize our under-
standings of the past, globalization uses dehistoricism, along with other 
weapons, to sever the present from the pa t- what good are tales of 
yore in explicating these troubled time ? A uch, while for Dirlik, 
"[p]ostcoloniali m then is merely the current expres ion of forms of 
knowledge that have been around for a long time, except that there was 
no consciousness of it earlier," globalization is clearly a rupture with the 
past: "By contra t, advocate of globalism leave no doubt about ~he 
break they seek to accompli h between the present and the past, includ-
ing a break between a present condition and the factor that may have 
brought about such a condition" (Dirlik 28). . . 
The idea that studies of globalization necess itate an ep1stemolog1cal 
break with past traditions is also central to the claims of the signi~ca~t 
earlier theorists of globalization . Roland Robertson, whose authority m 
fact is invoked by Dirlik on hi way to his argument, con ider insight 
earned from the past redundant in coming to terms with "the ba ic and 
shifting terms of the contemporary world order" (qtd. in Dirlik 29). But 
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perhaps the most striking argument in this direction, that of globaliza-
tion's rupture with the past as opposed to old-style European imperial-
ism, is to be found in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's academic 
headline making publication, Empire, though the writer ' characteriza-
tion as an internet-age Marx and Engels on the Harvard paperback of it 
is less a break than a qualification of epistemological paradigms of the 
past. This move, as Hardt and Negri theorize, necessarily presupposes 
ontological changes that require shifts in disciplinary foci. Reminiscent 
ofDuring's point noted earlier, this shift involves the questioning of hi -
tory as a disciplinary tool in the study of the phenomena of globalization 
as contrasted to its indispensability with postcolonial scholars; in other 
words, whether or not' historicism' becomes a political bane. For I lardt 
and Negri , the hydra has, to invert Linebaugh and Rcdiker' s equation, 
undergone a complete metamorphosis or has been reincarnated into a 
new avatar: "the construction of Empire is a step forward in order to do 
away with any nostalgia for the power structures that preceded it and 
refuse any political strategy that involves returning to the old arrange-
ment, such as trying to resurrect the nation-state to protect against glo-
bal capital" (Hardt and Negri 43).2 That the change is truly a qualitative 
one is reflected in the drastic biological transformations of its working 
metaphors: "in the contemporary passage to Empire, the structured tun-
nels of the mole have been replaced by the infinite undulations of the 
snake" (Hardt and Negri 57). Admittedly, Hardt and Negri are interested 
in the foundation of repressive forces, whether it is the centers of impe-
rialism or the famously virtual or decentered center of Empire, and its 
consequent rival, the ' multitude,' torn as it is between the battle-cry of 
the activist and the detachment of the theorist. Even so, such interests 
end up throwing valuable light on the various conditions resultant from 
these foundations, be they the 'past' of colonialization or the 'present' 
of globalization. 
Is the gulf between the theorist and the activist indeed the producer 
of some versjons of disagreement over the nature of the relationship 
between postcoloniali ty and globalization? I had an interesting conver-
sation recently with a scholar concerned with the bureaucratic institu-
tions of the British East India company - one who has no qualms about 
making the unrelenting declaration that she is more on the 'activist' 
side, way more .. . and the fervor of her convictions bespeak it, too. Hardt 
and Negri have given her pause- haven't they to us all before we burst 
into passionate applause or disappointment?- but post-pause, she 
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doesn't buy their theory of Empire's drastic rupture with imperialism, 
the intricacy of the snake-mole metaphor. I tried a couple of the cliched 
points of difference the dispersal of the idea of national interests, the 
overriding economic nature of Empire as opposed to its partial (if domi-
nant, nonetheless) role in the dominance of older European colonialism. 
The piloting prongs of the post-renaissance European domjnation over 
the globe were two, I uttered: the missionary zeal to convert and the 
economic greed of trade ... but doesn't the move into outright annexation 
put on an overtly political mantle, sooner or later? Redfacedfirang trad-
ers they were, in Aurangzeb's stately Mughal court, and even after the 
decisive victory over Nawab Siraj-au-daullah on the battlefields of Plas-
sey courtesy, the treachery of Mi1jafar, with weakling Bahadur Shah 
Zafar in prison, kept the reins in the hands of the East India Company-
though Clive be more of a man than Curzon, many might argue from the 
cigar-room of Bath ... but the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 precipitated Her 
Majesty Queen Victoria into complete control, didn't it? A Crowned 
dominance that would last till the bloodied power-tran fer of 1947. This 
isn't network power, surely? Surely the sun that never set on the British 
Empire discriminated between the inside and the outside? 
NO, says my activist friend. The chartered companies, she says, the 
chartered companies. They may not quite be the eighteenth century har-
bingers of Pepsi and its Indian incarnation in the Maha-Cola, but some-
thing in that direction, surely. Even if there be the British and the Dutch 
East India company, even if Clive and Dupleix's bloody egobattle takes 
on the rabid colors of Anglo-French hostility. I had to sigh you-have-a-
point-there, and you know, Ian Baucom 's romantic view of the pa tin 
"Global it, Inc:, or The Cultural Logic of Global Cultural Studies" does 
reconstruct the chartered companies in a similar light. But is the refusal 
of newness, of ruptures with the past, a kind of hi torical structuralism? 
The Oedipus myth replicates itself in Hamlet, as Mon ieur Levi-Strauss 
might have said, as imperialism repeats itself in Empire. Perhaps the 
answer I ies in Dipeshbabu 's shomoy-gronthi, the stubborn time-knots. 
The present, after all, is always in the past, the pa tin the present. As the 
south-Asian subaltern historiographers have pointed out again and 
again, the historicist march of time can ' t pull the wool over our eyes not 
now, not ever! 
And the theorist-activist pick is not the only one that accounts for 
versions of difference, discrepancy or continuity, depending on your 
affil iation. One could go on forever. But more intere ting than a com-
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parative analysis of the two phenomena is how they interact with each 
other, on a site which draws in both. Contemporary South-Asia is fertile 
ground for this negotiation, and even more so, the figure of the South-
Asian intellectual working in the US academy. 
A Knotty kinship, too 
"Time, as the expression goes in my language," writes Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, "situates us within the structure of a granthi; hence the 
Bengali word shomoy-granthi, shomoy meaning 'time' and granthi 
referring to joints of various kinds, from the complex formations of 
knuckles on our fingers to the joints on a bamboo stick" ( hakrabarly 
112). Such time knots account for, as he puts it later, "the plurality that 
inheres in the ' now, ' the lack of totality, the constant fragmentariness, 
that constitutes one's present" (Chakrabarty 243). 
Such a time-knot, I'd like to argue, is to be found in the sites of 
negotiation between postcoloniality and globalization, as for instance in 
the South-Asian cultural reality of today, and in the lives and works of 
contemporary diasporic South-Asian intellectuals. Inasmuch as such 
knots exist, they defy any notions of a 'rupture' with the past as claimed 
by several high priests of globalization, but in the commona lity of the 
crusade they both launch against historicist understandings of time and 
their cause-effect flows, perhaps a 'rupture' in a smooth line inevitably 
ends up in 'knots.' In other words, is the idea of a 'rupture' the temporal 
expression of that which the 'knot' is a spatia l metaphor? Causa lity, 
after all, is the vi llain here, along with the teleological master-narratives 
of history, as During noted before. To hold During 's other term, that 
reserved for globalization, to this temporalizing lest would, however, be 
to complicate things infinitely-does 'de-territorialization' amount to a 
space-knot or a spatial rupture? It somehow seems that the motif of 'de-
territorialization' is an easier sell among readers of globalization (cyber-
shops, 1-800 numbers, the unreal reality of diaspora) than the reality of 
space in these processes as championed by theorists like Sasscn. Take 
for instance her idea of the 'global city,' that space which is surely tied 
in a strange time-knot with the older forms of modernity and empire, the 
sordid-imperial text of Baudelaire and Eliot and Joyce? 
The question remains: what sort of relationships can 'de-territorial-
ization' be perceived to retain with older spaces, territories? No teleo-
logical, master-narratives of space, surely? I I ere 'rupture' may not be 
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such a good friend of ' knot' surely there is more of a knot between the 
global south and the north than a drastic rupture? Bangalore and Seattle 
seem to be knotting all right, turning the knotty discrepancies of interna-
tional time-zones into knots of profit- while San Jose sleeps, Bombay 
works ... Manhattan keeps the other half of the clock ticking while 
Hyderabad earns its night's rest! A knot, mind you, not a contin-
uum ... not the continuous economic subjection, the subject-object binar-
ism, the smoothness of imperial trade implicit in post-renaissance 
European colonialism. The prosperous hi-tech cyberspatial Pacific rim 
of globalized quasi-future, not the parti-colored Atlantics of colonial 
pasts. Shrinkage of the world is hardly tantamount to a rupture, so 
unwieldy knots of space arc it. Sassen would agree, one thinks. lsn ' t the 
globa l city one such enormous space-knot, with the glitzy Ritz of global 
finance and skyrocketing Dow-Jones downtown, the seedy shanties of 
underpaid female illegal immigrant labor from across the southern bor-
ders? Space-knots arc time-knots too, for in the interlocking of Wall 
Street and immigrant ghettos what do we have if not the paradox of the 
cyberfuturi tic and the ' nonmodcm?' Interesting how South-Asian met-
ropolitan centers reproduce such di tressing knot of time and space, of 
prosperity Bombay' the city of the incredibly affluent Malabar Hills 
with chauffeur-driven Mercedes and of Dharavi- the largest, the most 
appalling conglomeration of slums in Asia. 
What a site! 
But what about the itcs where postcoloniality and globalization 
have to battle out their idcntitie , to negotiate them? What spatial and 
temporal knots clog up there, what space-time rupture ? Speaking of 
actual places/geographical locations/nations, few parts of the world 
occupy as explosive a position as Latin America and the Caribbean 
islands in this patio-temporal negotiation. Already parti-colored with 
the imprints of the colonialism of various nations, Latin America and 
more strikingly, the Caribbean, occupy strategic po itions with respect 
to globalization owing to what e lse- their physical proximity to the 
United Statcs.3 
Central and south America remain the most volatile itc of the 
myriad of these power plays - beginning from the economic domina-
tion, through outright political big-brotherhood to the flagrant trinity of 
militarism-drugs-illegal immigration. In the Caribbean, for instance, 
disclosure 13 23 
Majumdar 
colonial legacies like cricket thrive on (as more and more former colo-
nies flex cricketing muscles over a quick-weakening English cricket 
team), and Oxbridge commands more socio-intellectual glamour than 
its closer American counterparts. Commonwealth prizes and scholar-
ships get administered and literary and cricketing celebrities continue to 
be knighted by the British Crown as well. But at the end of the day, the 
power-breathing proximity of the US is real enough, in a way it is not in 
other postcolonial countries, as those in Asia and Africa, where the US, 
with all its power and glamour, is far away. Clearly, in a book like 
Jamaica Kincaid's A Small Place, time-knots are well-knotted with 
space-knots- British colonialism is the past that is knotted into the 
present, while the geopolitics of power place it in the volati le Central 
American space-knot of US power, military, economic and political. 
And in its cinematic rereading, Stephanie Black's Life and Debt, the 
White House dominated World Bank and its loan-traps remain the cen-
tral concern. Such a network of imperialism and Empire also criss-
crosses the formerly Spanish and Portuguese dominated Latin America 
and its North American counterpart, Mexico, the latter being the clo c t 
southern (clearly in both senses of the word) neighbor of the debated 
center of Empire. 
In fact, the integrity of the notion of 'southernness ' of Latin 
America (once again, both geographically and politically) with respect 
to the US is precisely what is under threat in the wake of globalization, 
leading to what I'd consider one of the most critical space-knots of our 
times. Is Latin America more of a reality down south, or in the Bronx, 
Miami or Los Angeles? Reflecting on the impact of this dramatic space-
knot (even people-knot) on relevant area studies, the Latin Americanist 
Alberto Moreiras writes: 
24 
U.S. Latinamericanism is certainly conditioned, although perhaps 
not yet to a sufficient degree, by the drastic demographic changes 
and the massive Latin American immigration to the country in 
recent decades. U.S. Latinamericanism can no longer pretend 
merely to be an epistemic concern with the geographic other south 
of the border. Instead, the borderlands have moved northward and 
within. (Moreiras 83) 
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Children of Incest? 
Oiasporic intellectuals, precisely those from the f~nner colonies of 
European countries now working in the US academy, it seems to me, 
embody the dualism of both the time-knots and space-knots as thos~ 
I've been discussing. I' d like to argue that such intellectuals c~m?nse 
one of the most significant sites of the negotiation of post~olomalt~ and 
globalization, in the manner in which they must ne~essanly reconcile 
their identities as postcolonials (with respect to their legacy of post-
renaissance European colonialism) to those of diasporic professionals. 
whose location within the 'metropolis' of Empire (a la Hardt and Negn) 
has largely been contingent upon processes of globaliza~ion. . . ,, 
Moreiras's essay "Global Fragments: A Second Latmamencamsm 
indeed demon trates how erroneous any split between the phenomena of 
globalization and its studies in the institutional space of the academy is 
how the tatter, instead of being an objective, independent assessment 
of the e geopolitical practices from a .space outside th~m , is r~t,her 
implicit in such proces cs and renect1ve of the~ . Les~te.Sklair s assess-
ment of 'Third World elites' surely applies to d1a pone mtellectuals 
from the global south working in the metropolitan univer ities of the 
US: 
Third World elites do not form a comprador class in the sense of 
serving First World interests or assimilating into western culture. 
Rather, they constitute a transnational capitalist class wh~se mem-
bers act in the interest of the global system. Like tran national cor-
porations (TNCs) their allegiance is not to the na~i~~- tale but to a 
global consumerism that thrives on cultural hybnd1ttes. (Sharpe 
185) 
Some important qualification are in order here, in.a much a~ such 
intellectuals are engaged in critiques of cultural and ep1stemolog1cal 
paradigms of which processes of postcolonial~ty and global~zation are a 
part. From one such diasporic intellectual ArJun App~dura1, ~omes. an 
important insight about the ways in which they compltcate ept tem1c. 
knots as it were in the creation of what he calls " ideoscapes," reflectmg 
the in,creasingly complicated realities of postcolonial cultur.es in tl~e 
wake of globalization: "The fluidity of ideoscapes i comp heated m par-
ticular by the growing dia poras (both voluntary and involuntary) of 
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intellectuals who continuously inject new meaning-streams into the dis-
course of democracy in different parts of the world" (37). Whether or 
not postcoloniality or globalization can enter ' history after Euroccntri-
cism,' the only site of poss ible critique of Eurocentricism i the 
diasporic intellectuals, agents of empowerment located within Eurocen-
tric matrices of power/knowledge - notably the academy. Well-versed in 
the Eurocentric canons of knowledge, these intellectuals of postcolonial 
origin - or of 'Third World,' to use a more controversial term engage 
in their critique. Dirlik writes: 
The contemporary critique of Eurocentri sm is driven not by victim-
ization by Eurocentrism but by empowerment withi n it. Foremost 
among modern critics of Eurocentrism arc those who arc not mar-
ginalized by Eurocentrism or left out of its structure of power, but 
those who claim ' hybridities' that give access to both Euroccntrism 
and to its Others, probably more of the former than the latter. If Ori-
entalism was a product of Euro-Americans located in "contact 
zones" outside Euro-America on the margins of non-Euro-Ameri-
can societies, anti-Eurocentrism is a product of contact zones 
located at the hearts of Euro-America or in transnational structures 
or circuits of power. (Dirlik 36) 
Things were probably simpler when in a slightly earlier period the 
postcolonial intellectual worked with the cultures consequent upon the 
encounters of the former empires and their colonies, even though such 
encounters and their resultant cultures themselves amounted to an unset-
tling of geographic and epistemic boundaries of earlier canons. Such 
int~llectuals might have talked about the works of Y.S. Naipaul and 
Chmua Achebe or the large-scale immigration to Britain from its former 
colo.nies. As l~te as 1995, Jenny Sharpe wrote: "A glance at any English 
curnculum wtll reveal that the Anglophone writings of former British 
colonies are now an essential offering. This inclusion represents the 
effort to reshape British literature in the same way that the canon of 
American literature had been transformed by the introduction of minor-
ity literatures and cultures" ( J 81 ). But with the spread of what Hardt and 
Negri calls Ei:npire, es~ecially towards the latter half of the 20th century, 
and fina1ly with the tnumph of global capitalism in a post-cold war era, 
the new behemot~ of globalization increasingly has come to complicate 
an already complicated phenomenon of postcolonial ity vis-a-vis post-
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renaissance European imperialism. Whether or not discourses of global-
ization were about to engulf postcolonial studies, drastic epistemic 
changes were now in order again. To give an example from south-Asian 
literature, if the former practice involved study of the fictions of Salman 
Rushdie and Raja Rao, the newer cultures necessitated encounters with 
the diasporic implications of the works of Bharati Mukherjee and Pico 
Iyer. Questions as to what might be the relationship between the former 
with the later corpus are therefore, not easy to answer, and easy blanket 
nomenclatures like Anglophone Indian literatures will not do what with 
writers like Mukherjee and Mistry being more amenable to being linked 
to the American and Canadian canons, respectively. 
The santal in the Nike sweatshop: South-
Asian insights 
Clearly, the south-Asian intellectuals working in the US academy, 
as much as those from Central and South America, are faced with the 
complex epistemic negotiations of the cultures of postcoloniality and 
globa lization even a they deal with the interaction of the two processes 
within the matrices of their very identities. Even though they haven't 
been touched by the immediacy of Empire as the Caribbean and Latin 
America have been, the case of the south-Asian diasporic intellectual is 
interesting, notably in the momentum postcolonial scholarship from that 
part of the world has gathered in the US academy, perhaps partly atten-
dant on the duration and impact of British colonialism in the e part 
India being the fabled "jewel in the Crown" of the British Monarch. 
Many would probably go so fa r as to consider Subaltern Studies, origi-
nally an offshoot of South-Asian area studies, to be the mo t significant 
paradigm of postcolonialist epistemic practices in the US academy 
today. 
The case of the south-Asian diasporic intellectual i therefore an 
occasion to consider this signi ficant clement of the interaction of po t-
coloniality and globa lization, namely, area studies. Many of the intellec-
tuals negotiating this tension were originally (and in mo t ca es, till 
are) area studies scholars whose disciplinary structures, already at least 
partially contingent upon (post)coloniali ty arc now becoming infinitely 
more complicated by the advent of globalization. With respect to the 
area studies he's concerned with Moreiras ee , after Hardt, the transi-
tion from area studic Latinamcricanism to a Latinamcricani m contin-
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gent upon processes and discourses of globalization as a move from the 
work of an epistemic society of discipline to that of an epistemic society 
of control. Important assumptions about the ways of under landing 
alterity and the resultant Orientalist practices are implicit here: "If it is 
fair to say that the first Latinamericanism operates under the assumption 
that alterity can always, and indeed must always, be theoretically 
reduced, the second Latinamericanism understands itself in epistemic 
solidarity with the residual voices, or silences, of Latin American alter-
ity" (Moreiras 89). 
This dualism resonates with During's encounter of critical postco-
lonialism and globalization: "[T]he category of globalization has, for 
the most part, superceded that of 'postcolonia lism' and that critical post-
colonialism needs to be seen not simply as globa lization 's enemy but (in 
part) as its effect. That is, globalization and critical postcolonialism 
have a weakly dialectical relation" (During 385). This resonance i a 
significant one, as critical postcolonialism is the force that is dcci ivc in 
the formation of subaltern nationalisms, as a ripo te both to colonial-
isms of the past and the globalizations of the present and the future. It i 
in this troubled site of subaltern nationalism that area studies makes sig-
nificant discoveries with respect not only to (post)colonialism and glo-
balization, but also to revisionist historiography, as is exemplarily 
demonstrated in the South-Asian case. In The Nation and Its Fragments, 
the subaltern historiographer Partha Chatterjee cha llenges the notion 
that nationalism is a purely Western import to colonial and postcolonial 
countries by showing how in India the real nationalist project was 
launched not in the outer/material domain of national culture (where the 
West had established its dominance) but in the inner/spiritual domain 
(where indigenous superiority was taken for granted): "The home, I sug-
gest, was not a complementary but rather the original site on which the 
hegemonic project of nationalism was launched" (Chatterjee 136). 
When South-Asian elites come to occupy the position of diasporic 
intellectuals (a twice-exiled one, as Said points out in his influential 
essay on the subject) in the US, they invariably end up acquiring a di f-
ferent kind of consciousness about their location in their own nations 
and with respect to such subaltern nationalisms easy responses to the 
twin processes of imperialism and Empire. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that such diasporic South-Asian intellectuals have taken recourse to 
revisionist hi storiography in order to critically reexamine the ideologies 
and realities of subaltern nationalisms and to seek to restore agency to 
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the various marginalized populations within the nation (a red-herring 
effort accord ing to many, even though the gesture remains indispens-
ab le). Aijaz Ahmad, in In Theory, engages in such a critique of subaltern 
nationalisms even as he critiques Euro-American rhetoric of 'other-
ness. ' Partha Chatterjee engages in a similar project in his effort to tell 
the suppressed stories in the female autobiographies in 19th century 
Bengal. He writes, after telling the story of the Bengali stage actress 
Noti Binodini: 
Indeed, the opening up of the whole problematic of the national 
project within and outside the domain of the state makes it possible 
for us now to make the radical struggle with colonialism, contained 
many po sibilities of the authentic, creative, and plural develop-.. 
ment of social identities that were violently disrupted by the politi-
cal history of the postcolonial state seeking to replicate the modular 
forms of the modem nation-state. ( 156) 
Also imilar is the revisioni t historiography of the members of the Sub-
altern Studies Collective in their project to restore agency to the subal-
tern in a British colonial or bourgeois nationalist historiography. Dipesh 
Chakrabarty's work becomes especially interesting here, in that his cri-
tique of historicism and the teleological, rationalizing processes of the 
master narratives of history is simultaneously directed at the secular 
rationalisms implicit in the work of the subaltern historiographers a at 
the privileged nexus of reason and subjectivity structuring Eurocentric 
hi toriography that "enabled European domination of the world in the 
nineteenth century." 
Much of the critical force of South-Asian subaltern studies I'd like 
to argue, comes from the diasporic locations of its practitioners that are 
made contingent by a globalization that does not hesitate to extract its 
pound of flesh (read 'share of immigrants') from the academy. It is in 
this critical force that a significant interaction of postcoloniality and glo-
balization is to be found. Arguably, subaltern studies, with its stronger 
mooring in postcolonial cpistemologies remains oriented towards the 
past, while the realities of globalization continue to dee~ ively af~ect ~he 
present and the future. But, as Moreiras has so aptly pomted out m his 
essay, it is precisely the realities of globalization including its immi?ra-
tion of elite and subaltern populations, that de tabilize uch boundanes. 
Arca studies arc, therefore, much more than the mean of excrci ing 
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power/knowledge over the 'Orient,' they arc critical to apprehending 
the geopolitics of the contemporary world order, especially with regard 
to the global expansion of US capitalism. That the traditional grids of 
power and subjectivity which characterized the organization of postco-
lonial studies since Said's Orienta/ism are inadequate to apprehending 
the realities of the "Disjuncture and Difference in Global Cultural Econ-
omy" is made clear by Appadurai and the various perspectival con-
structs that he calls 'scapes:' "The new global cultural economy has to 
be seen as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order that cannot any 
longer be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models (even 
those that might account for multiple center and peripheries" (Appadu-
rai 32). Appadurai seems to carry I Iardt and Negri 's project even farther 
in the fragmentation of the sites of power, and it is no surprise that 
Simon During finds in his work "a theory of cultural globalization 
brushed by post-structuralism - a celebratory rather than critical global-
ism," that perceives a world which is "a radical departure from the colo-
nial" (During 388). Appadurai therefore, i a prime exemplar of the 
South-Asianist who seems to have completed the transition from po t-
coloniality to globalization. 
In spite of all the post-structuralist de-centering of power, in the fig-
uration of postcolonial theory within a globalized sphere, the crucial fig-
ure remains that of the subaltern. It is she who is con figured in the 
Foucaldian power/knowledge grid in the face of privi lcged western sub-
jectivities as signified, albeit in different ways, in both colonialism and 
the expansion of global capital. This is where the work of Gayatri Spi-
vak becomes significant. From the beginning, Spivak has maintained a 
significant but critical involvement with the Suba ltern Studies Collec-
tive, as for instance in her essay "Subaltern Studies: Dcconstructing I I is-
toriography," where she foregrounds the notion of 'subaltern effect' as a 
means of apprehending the subaltern consciousness. Spivak carries on 
this project in her celebrated essay, "Can the subaltern speak?" specif-
ically the problem of restoring voice and agency to the subaltern - and in 
her 1999 book, A Critique of Postco/onial Reason, where she chooses 
the term "native informant." It is Spivak's work that most clearly tics 
the subaltern from British colonial history of South-Asia with the mar-
ginalized and the disempowered in the imperialist expansions of global 
capitalism - the santal and the Rani of Sirmur and the poor Bangladeshi 
woman harnessed, in flagrant violation of her human rights, in the capi-
talist systems of transnational corporations. 
30 Pangaea 
Globalization, or the Vanishing Present of Postcolonialism 
Perhaps, it is also time to rephrase the earlier question in a South-
Asian context will there be any South-Asian postcolonialist working 
in the US academy who's not also a globalization theorist? A book like 
Aijaz Ahmad's In Theo1y provides a complex answer in the negative. 
Ripostes to Wes tern theorization of the ' rhetoric of otherness,' in this 
book, ties in as much with the geopolitics of power in the world-system 
as with the legacies of English education and canon-formation in post-
colonial India. At such moments, it does seem that imperialism and 
Empire are not such different animals as Negri and Hardt would make 
them out to be. Therefore, why should the move from postcoloniality to 
globalization be such a drastic transformation for the South-Asianist or 
for any intellectual from the global south working in the metropolitan 
university? 
The phenomenon of colonialism, however, still remains a bigger 
and more pervasive question in the South-Asian context much more 
so than that of globalization, making scholars like Appadurai, therefore, 
a rarer breed. No South-Asianist has, for instance, engaged in a shock-
ingly perceptive psychoanalytic dissection of globalization as has been 
done to the phenomenon of (post)colonia lism by that brilliant Fanon of 
India, Ashish Nandy, in his classic The Intimate Enemy. As is easily evi-
dent through, say, a comparison of South-Asian immigration patterns to 
the UK and the US (assuming that immigration to the former is more of 
a postcolonial phenomenon while in the latter case it has been acceler-
ated by the logic of globa lization- a shaky corollary yet with some truth 
in it), and as implied by Sharpe, the reality of the South-Asian diaspora 
in the American capital of Empire is, in some ways, an artificial or a 
synthetic one - even in comparison to the immigrant populations from 
Latin America and many parts of East Asia. The lack of a clear histori-
cal (as with Britain and its former colonies) or geographical link (a the 
US has with Mexico and Central America, or even between east Asia 
and California) between the South-Asian countries and the US limits 
such immigration to a small group of elites, to its rich, its educated, and 
its skilled professionals if we choose to ignore the smaller immigra-
tion streams that took place during the west coast railroad constructions 
of the early 20th century. The epistemic earthquake in Latin American 
studies that Moreiras described due to large-scale immigration to El 
Norte- creating communities that are perhaps more 'natural and 
'moored in reality' with populations engaged in everything from execu-
tive positions in the Cabinet to pay-by-hour farm work- i clearly a far 
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cry with respect to South-Asian studies in the US. Unless one considers 
the global spread of Indian indented laborers in the past to places as far-
flung as Fiji and Africa as a past paradigm of globalization, it i perhaps 
safe to say that the 'real' negotiation of postcoloniality and globalization 
hasn ' t even properly begun with respect to the diasporic intellectual 
from South Asia- not to the degree with which it has intensified in 
regard to the Caribbean and Latin America. What is visible here, due to 
the distinction of postcolonial scholarship from that part of the world, is 
arguably, only the tip of an iceberg that the future wi ll reveal more of. 
Notes 
1. Exactly what th is attitude is Dirlik chooses not to amplify, and the 
question that comes to my mind immediately is whether ei ther of these 
two phenomena can enter, to use Dirlik 's own phrase, Hhistory after 
Eurocentricism?" 
2. In Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker's The Many !leaded fh1dra, 
ironically, the hydra, constituting of slaves, rebel sai lors and pirates of 
post-renaissance Atlantic, signifies something approximating the ragbag 
collection of forces that would be likely to counter the metamorpho ing 
hydra of Hardt and Negri, which of course in their book is a metaphor of 
the hegemonic force of Empire itself. 
3. Of course, to what extent the US is the center of the phenomena of 
global ization- which would entai l dealing with the issue as to what 
extent global ization has a center at all is a heated issue. I lardt and 
Negri's fascinating chapter on the US constitution is theoretically foun-
dational here, even though it needs no ghost to tell us what is the Mecca 
of capitalism in the world today, the singular pole of power in a post-
Cold War era. The concept of the non-annexing imperialism of network 
power, that destroyer of inside-outside binarism implicit in the expan-
sionist philosophy of the US constitution, sounds fascinat ing indeed, 
perhaps a tad too alluring to our intellectual consumerism. The trans-
national nature of globalization 's prime vehic les, the multinational cor-
porations, causes a mild erosion of the idea of a nation as a center but 
like my friend the scholar-activist, most people wou ld say that ca~ ' t 
'fool' them. And going by Empire, Empire is not merely economic-
network power is more complex than that. 
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